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Abstract. 
 
There is a dearth of information about everyday performance difficulties of adult dyslexic 
people. This study investigates the empirical support for anecdotal reports of increased 
vulnerability to distraction in dyslexia, using the self-report Cognitive Failures 
Questionnaire (CFQ). Two groups of university students, a dyslexic group and a non-
dyslexic control group, were asked to complete the CFQ. The dyslexic group reported a 
higher frequency of everyday lapses in cognition, scoring significantly higher on a number 
of CFQ items. Representative problems include distractibility, over-focusing (so that 
relevant peripheral information is missed), and word-finding difficulties. A similar measure 
administered to close friends of dyslexic people, the CFQ-for-others, yielded results 
consistent with those of the CFQ, with major findings being that their friends considered 
them to be more disorganised, more distractible, and more absent-minded than normal. The 
results indicate clearly the continuing effects of dyslexia on cognition in adulthood and 
demonstrate that dyslexic impairments are not limited to “artificial” laboratory tasks or 
even literacy tasks but, instead, pervade everyday life. 
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Introduction. 
 
Developmental dyslexia is a condition that affects some 5% of people in English-
speaking countries (Badian, 1984). There is a strong genetic link (e.g. Gayan & Olson, 
1999) and so children do not ‘grow out of’ dyslexia. The phonological deficit hypothesis 
(Bradley & Bryant, 1983; Snowling, 1987; Stanovich, 1988) was the dominant theory of 
dyslexia in the last twenty years and, as a result, has had a major influence on research. The 
hypothesis asserts that an impairment in phonological processing is responsible for most, if 
not all, of the reading and spelling difficulties associated with dyslexia. In addition to 
problems in the phonological skill, however, deficits have been reported in other domains. 
For example, Wolf and Bowers (1999) have integrated a number of findings to propose the 
'double deficit' hypothesis, which posits that dyslexic children have core deficits not only in 
phonological skills but also in speed of processing. As a result, while the impairments 
associated with the condition are well documented, there is still debate as to the underlying 
causes of dyslexia. 
Laboratory studies are critically important in attempting to investigate this issue, but 
it is possible that more ‘ecologically valid’ studies of real-world performance will provide 
complementary information that help to build a more complete picture of the everyday 
problems of dyslexic people, and will therefore be of value in developing applied support 
environments. It is also possible that the ecologically valid analyses will yield theoretical 
insights that are not apparent from the constrained conditions of the laboratory (cf. Neisser, 
1978, although see Banaji & Crowder, 1994 for a dissenting view). 
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Since dyslexia is at least partly genetic (see Fisher & Smith, 2001, for a review), 
there will be a similar prevalence of dyslexia in adults as in children. The demand for self-
appraisal and, more obviously, the need to order one’s own life in adulthood makes it 
salient that such everyday investigations will be suited better to adult populations. 
Moreover, McLoughlin, Fitzgibbon and Young (1994) argue that it is important to treat 
adult dyslexics as a population distinct from childhood dyslexics, in that they have different 
problems and requirements. They argue that “adult dyslexics are not simply children with a 
learning disability ‘grown up’” (p. 1) and that problems remain even when reading is 
remediated. This perspective means that a broader view of dyslexia must be taken than one 
that concentrates solely on the reading, writing, and spelling deficits concomitant with the 
disorder (e.g. Frith, 1985; Snowling, Goulandris, Bowlby & Howell, 1986; Stanovich, 
1988). Thus, it is important to perform detailed studies on cognitive function in adult 
dyslexics. Consequently, this study focuses on the everyday memory performance of just 
such an experimental group. 
Despite the importance of such work to both dyslexia theory and educational and 
support services, little empirical work has been published that examines the everyday 
cognition of dyslexics in either childhood or adulthood. Since the UK Disability 
Discrimination Act 1995 (c.50) requires employers to make suitable accommodations to 
help dyslexic adults cope with their working environments, it is crucial to attempt to 
characterise the problems they are likely to face.  
A crucial aspect of everyday memory is prospective remembering, the ability to 
remember to do a certain thing at a certain time. McDaniel and Einstein (2000) have 
proposed a multi-process framework for prospective memory recall, with a number of 
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central cognitive processes being involved in prospective remembering. These processes 
include one in which an executive attentional system (such as the Supervisory Attentional 
System of Norman & Shallice, 1986) monitors the environment for markers of the intended 
action and/or brings the action to mind periodically, thereby maintaining the activation level 
of the association between the cue and the action. Relatively resource free and spontaneous 
automatic processes to cue remembering are also possible within this model. Kliegel, 
Martin, McDaniel and Einstein (2001) consider the allocation of attention away from an 
ongoing task to a prospective task to be selective (especially when the time of the 
prospective memory event can be anticipated), rather than being a general drain on 
attentional resources. It has also been proposed that an ACT* (Anderson, 1983) production 
rule can be used to explain aspects of event-based (when a cue in the environment causes 
memory for the action to be activated) prospective memory (Marsh, Hicks & Hancock, 
2000). Ongoing activities that require more executive processes and thus, more attentional 
resources, reduce the efficacy of event-based prospective memory (Marsh & Hicks, 1998). 
Given the reports of dyslexic problems with automatisation and attention (e.g. Nicolson & 
Fawcett, 1990), it is likely that such impairments will manifest themselves in naturalistic 
prospective memory settings. Nicolson and Fawcett’s Dyslexic Automatisation Deficit 
hypothesis predicts that deficits would become apparent in dyslexic performance when 
heavy cognitive/ attentional demands are made upon the system, with factors such as 
tiredness and stress predicted to affect the dyslexic group more than the controls. 
Some evidence for everyday memory problems in dyslexia is extant in the literature 
(e.g. Turner, 1997). McLoughlin, Fitzgibbon and Young (1994) provide extensive evidence 
that factors such as reduced working memory have wide-ranging effects in many situations. 
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More specific impairments of everyday memory in dyslexia have also been reported. For 
example, Miles (1982) argues that temporal sequencing problems associated with dyslexia 
extend to everyday life, for example in ordering one’s life, telling the time, and 
remembering days of the week and months of the year. Temporal processing difficulties 
have been found also by Tallal (1985). There have been reports of increased forgetfulness 
and clumsiness in dyslexics (e.g. Miles, 1982; Augur, 1985; McLoughlin, Fitzgibbon & 
Young, 1994). Experimental evidence on motor skill and dyslexia presented by Fawcett and 
Nicolson (1995) has supported such reports. Although many motor decrements have 
disappeared by late adolescence, older dyslexics have problems with sequencing (e.g. 
Wolff, Michel, Ovrut & Drake, 1990) and with planning (Torgeson, 1977; Levin, 1990). 
Impairments with planning will obviously impinge upon academic life. For example, Gilroy 
and Miles (1996) report that dyslexic students have problems in essay writing as a result of 
planning and structuring difficulties. An increased propensity to daydreaming in dyslexia 
has also been reported (Augur, 1985). 
One potential source of variance in everyday cognition is provided by the frequency 
with which plans go awry or actions are performed not as intended. These “slips of action” 
(Reason, 1979) form one subcategory of such cognitive failure, the focus of this study. In 
order to gain a more quantitative assessment of the relative frequency of such errors in 
dyslexics and non-dyslexics, a self-report measure was administered. The Cognitive 
Failures Questionnaire (CFQ) of Broadbent, Cooper, FitzGerald and Parkes (1982) is a 
twenty-five item self-report measure that is designed to probe the incidence and pattern of 
cognitive failure in everyday life. It has been used extensively in the psychological 
literature, being employed recently, for example, to examine everyday cognition in the 
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elderly (Klumb, 2001), in recreational users of “ecstasy” (Rodgers, 2001), and in psychiatric 
contexts (Wagle, Berrios & Ho, 1999). The CFQ assesses a number of different types of 
error in ongoing cognition, such as slips of memory, language, and attention. Under 
laboratory conditions, dyslexic impairments have been reported in all three of these 
constructs (e.g. Vellutino, 1979; Bradley & Bryant, 1983; Jorm, 1983; Nicolson & Fawcett, 
1990). Therefore, if laboratory studies do measure non-trivial processes, then the responses 
of an individual with dyslexia would be expected to be significantly different from those of 
a non-dyslexic, with a higher incidence of cognitive failures being expected in dyslexia. 
Cohen (1996) argues that self-report questionnaires are assessed better by gaining an 
independent measure of everyday performance, such as that provided by ratings by a third 
party. In the present study, this concern is addressed by the CFQ-for-others, a questionnaire 
to be completed by individuals who have a significant relationship with the CFQ 
respondent, such as family members or partners. The CFQ-for-others provides a means of 
determining whether the self-reports of CFQ respondents are idiosyncratic or whether their 
beliefs about their own cognitive failures are generally accurate. Broadbent et al. (1982) 
found there to be a good correlation between the judgements of CFQ respondents 
concerning cognitive failures and those of the CFQ-for-others respondents. The correlation 
suggests that individuals who report more cognitive failures do in fact produce more such 
errors. However, everyday memory failures such as those identified by Vinegrad’s (1994) 
Adult Dyslexia Check List may be due to lowered self-concepts in dyslexia (cf. Riddick, 
Sterling, Farmer & Morgan, 1999). Self-esteem problems in adult dyslexia are most 
apparent in high-literacy settings (Gerber, Schneiders, Paradise, Reiff, Ginsborg & Popp, 
1990). Since the participants employed in the present study are all university students, the 
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CFQ-for-others should permit an important estimation of the extent to which self-concepts 
play a part in rating cognitive failures. 
The results of the CFQ-for-others should be consistent with the CFQ in terms of 
group differences in overall scores, if the case for an increased susceptibility to everyday 
cognitive error in dyslexia is to be upheld. In particular, there should be a higher rating of 
disorganisation, clumsiness and absent-mindedness by those respondents who have day-to-
day contact with the dyslexic participants.  
 
Method. 
 
Participants.  
The participants consisted of two groups of university students. The dyslexic group 
consisted of 26 individuals (8 females, 18 males) and were all diagnosed within the 
Department of Psychology at The University of Sheffield, using Nicolson and Fawcett’s 
(1997) Adult Dyslexia Diagnostic Test. This adult dyslexia diagnosis tool provides an 
Adult Dyslexia Index (ADI) score for an individual, obtained from performance on four 
positive indicators of dyslexia. These are the full WAIS-R (Wechsler, 1986a), WORD 
spelling (Wechsler Objective Reading Dimensions; Wechsler, 1986b), speed and accuracy 
of reading  a nonsense passage known to identify deficits even in compensated dyslexics 
(Finucci, Guthrie, Childs, Abbey & Childs, 1976; Brachacki, Fawcett & Nicolson, 1994), 
and a previous diagnosis of dyslexia. Performance on each of the four indicators provides a 
score of 0, 0.5, or 1. The method of determining the cut-off scores on each of the indicators 
is described in depth by Nicolson and Fawcett (1997). Composite scores on the tests 
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provide an ADI score ranging between 0 (non-dyslexic) to 4 (dyslexic). Scores of 3 or more 
provide strong evidence for dyslexia, 2.5 represents good evidence for the condition, scores 
of 1.5 to 2 are taken as cases of “borderline” dyslexia, whilst 1 and below are interpreted as 
providing no evidence of dyslexia. In the present study, the dyslexic group had a mean ADI 
score of 2.90 (SD= 0.75), a good indication of dyslexia, and a mean IQ of 111.08 (SD= 
10.90).  
The control group comprised 22 non-dyslexics (10 females, 12 males). All controls 
reported no problems with literacy and this was supported by their writing and spelling on 
the written components of these and other tests that were administered to them (Smith-
Spark, 2000). Self-reports of being non-dyslexic have been found to be accurate by 
Nicolson and Fawcett (1997) in a study of 150 students, none of whom showed any 
evidence of dyslexia
1
.  
The average age of the two groups was 24.53 years (SD= 5.26) for the dyslexic 
group and 20.78 years (SD= 1.57) for the control group. The average number of years spent 
in education was 15.20 years (SD= 1.78) for the dyslexic group and 15.41 years (SD= 1.44) 
in the case of the control group. 
 
Design.  
The Cognitive Failures Questionnaire (CFQ) of Broadbent et al. (1982) was administered to 
two groups of participants, one consisting of dyslexic adult students and the other a control 
group of non-dyslexic students. The 25-item CFQ is argued to measure the relationship 
between attentional performance and general cognitive functioning. The questions relate to 
different aspects of cognitive functioning and failure, such as perceptual failures, 
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misdirected actions, and memory failures. The term “cognitive failure” is used as an 
umbrella term for all three types of slip.  
The CFQ-for-others is designed to gain an independent view of the participant’s 
behaviour, tapping the day-to-day experience of a significant other. In the original study 
Broadbent et al. use family or partners of the participant but due to the nature of student 
populations, the present study “housemate” has been added to this list of significant others.  
Bonferroni corrections were performed on the individual analyses of the items of the 
CFQ and CFQ-for-others in order to counter an inflated Type I error caused by multiple 
comparisons. The p-value for items on the CFQ had to be less than 0.002 and 0.005 for the 
CFQ-for-others to reach statistical significance at the .05 level. 
 
Materials.  
The Cognitive Failures Questionnaire (CFQ) and CFQ-for-others (Broadbent et al., 1982) 
were administered. Each questionnaire item required a number (0-4 inclusive) to be circled. 
4 corresponded to “Very Often” and 0 to “Never”. The direction of scoring for the CFQ was 
unidirectional, since pilot studies by Broadbent et al. (1982) found that reversed wording on 
some items only confused the participants and there were no differences in a small sample 
using reversed wording. In the case of the CFQ-for-others, half of the items began with 
“Very Often” and half with “Never”.  
 
Procedure. 
The Cognitive Failures Questionnaire (CFQ). The instructions were the same as 
those employed by Broadbent et al. (1982), again asking the respondent to consider 
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mistakes made by the CFQ respondent in the previous six months. The questions used in 
the CFQ are to be found in the Results section. Participants were allowed as long as they 
needed to complete the questionnaire. 
 
The CFQ-for-others. After completing the CFQ, participants were given the CFQ-for-others 
and asked to get someone that had day-to-day experience with them (i.e. a family member, 
partner, or housemate) to fill it in. The CFQ respondent was requested not to discuss the 
responses that he or she had made prior to the completion of the CFQ-for-others. The same 
set of instructions as Broadbent et al. (1982) employed, again asking the respondent to 
consider mistakes made by the CFQ respondent in the previous six months. 
The CFQ-for-others respondents were requested to complete the questionnaire and 
return it to the experimenter in a pre-paid envelope. Again, the questions can be found in 
the Results section. 
 
Results. 
 
The CFQ. 
 An independent groups t-test carried out on overall CFQ score revealed a significant 
difference between the groups, t (46) = -4.952, P< 0.001, with the dyslexics reporting 
significantly higher frequencies of slips (mean = 61.25, SD = 10.32) than the controls 
(mean = 47.75, SD = 8.21). The mean difference between the groups was thus 13.50. 
 The mean self-ratings of both groups on each item of the CFQ, together with 
univariate F-test results with (1, 43) D.F., are given in Table 1. Significant differences 
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between the two groups were found on fifteen of the twenty-five items of the questionnaire. 
In each case, the members of the dyslexic group rated themselves as producing slips of the 
type probed by that particular CFQ item more frequently than the control participants. 
Bonferroni corrections were applied to the data, after which significant differences 
remained on six questionnaire items (namely, Items 2, 7, 9, 14, 22, and 23). Pollina, 
Greene, Tunick and Puckett (1992) carried out a principal components analysis on CFQ 
data collected from 387 college students. Table 1 shows how the data from the present 
study fit the factors extracted from this large-scale study. It can be seen that the items on 
which the significant group differences emerged are spread across the five factors reported 
by Pollina et al.; namely distractibility, misdirected actions, spatial/kinaesthetic memory, 
memory for names, and interpersonal intelligence. 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE. 
On no item did the controls rate the frequency with which they produced cognitive 
failures significantly higher than the dyslexic group. Indeed, their mean ratings were higher 
on only three items, “15. Do you have trouble making up your mind?”, “24. Do you drop 
things?”, and “25. Do you find you can’t think of anything to say?”. 
 
The CFQ--for-others. 
The ratings for each question were added together to give a total CFQ-for-others score for 
each individual. This ranged from a minimum score of 0 to a maximum of 32. Respondents 
rated the cognitive failures of the dyslexic group (mean = 16.60, SD = 6.85) as being more 
frequent than those of the non-dyslexics (mean = 13.29, SD = 3.24), t (44) = -2.03, P < 
0.05. There was, therefore, a mean difference of 3.31 between the groups.  
 14 
Group mean ratings for the individual items of the CFQ-for-others are given in 
Table 2, together with univariate F-test results. The dyslexics were differentiated from the 
controls on three of the eight items of the CFQ-for-others. After Bonferroni corrections 
were applied to the analyses, differences on two of the items remained significant (“1. 
Absent-minded, that is making mistakes in what he/she is doing because he/she is thinking 
of something else?” and “7. Disorganised, that is, getting into a muddle when doing 
something because of lack of planning or concentration?”). 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE. 
Overall scores on the CFQ and CFQ-for-others yielded a significant one-tailed 
Pearson’s correlation between the two measures, r = 0.43, P = 0.003. 
 
Discussion. 
 
It can be seen that a number of significant group-related differences emerged on the CFQ. 
These were found on the overall measure of self-reported frequency of slips of action and 
also on individual questionnaire items. Overall, the dyslexic group rated themselves as 
experiencing cognitive slips more often than the control group. Such differences were 
reflected also in the overall score on the CFQ-for-others. The CFQ was shown to have good 
internal reliability. When the more stringent Bonferroni corrections were applied, 
significant group differences remained on six items concerned with slips of attention, 
absentmindedness, language skills (such as selection of words), and planning. It is 
interesting to note that the dyslexic group view their problems with names to be the result 
of failing to encode them in the first place (Item 2), and less a problem of memory per se. In 
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the light of previous work (e.g. Miles, 1982, 1983; Augur, 1985), it is surprising that no 
significant difference was found in the incidence of left and right confusions, although it 
should be noted that this result approached significance. 
Consistent with studies in laboratory settings and also theories of prospective 
memory (e.g. Marsh & Hicks, 1998; McDaniel & Einstein, 2000), it would seem that many 
of the problems encountered by dyslexics in everyday life are to do with the allocation of 
attentional resources and memory. Indeed, Pollina et al. (1992) have argued from their own 
data on the CFQ that attention is an important factor in everyday memory. An attentional 
account of the everyday memory impairments reported in this paper also consistent with the 
DAD hypothesis of Nicolson and Fawcett (1990). More generally, these difficulties argue 
for a broader explanation of the condition than one that focuses specifically on language 
impairments (e.g. Vellutino, 1979; Stanovich, 1988). Thus, the dyslexic adult will still 
encounter difficulties in everyday life, even if he or she is not working in a setting that 
demands competence in literacy or academic skills. 
 The use of students as the sample population may lead to an increased sensitivity to 
memory performance and to more opportunities for memory failures to occur in day-to-day 
life (Cornish, 2000), since they will be reliant on their memory in examinations. This may 
lead to over-reporting of failures relative to the general population. Whilst this is of no real 
concern to the results of the present study, since both groups consisted entirely of students, 
it would be interesting to examine the performance of dyslexics and controls drawn from a 
wider sample base. 
 The results of the CFQ-for-others indicate that the two groups differed significantly 
from each other overall. The dyslexic group was rated as more prone to slips on three of the 
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eight items of the questionnaire. When Bonferroni corrections were applied, significant 
differences remained on two of the CFQ-for-others items. On the basis of the ratings 
provided by individuals who had day-to-day contact with the participants, it would appear 
that the everyday impairments of the dyslexic group are centred on attention, 
absentmindedness, and organisation. In particular, their perceived significantly greater lack 
of organisational skills (Item 7) would appear to support the laboratory-based work of 
Torgesen (1977) and Levin (1990) who argue for planning deficits in dyslexia. Again, the 
increased vulnerability to distraction and lack of efficiency in planning, highlighted by both 
the CFQ and CFQ-for-others, would suggest some impairment in attentional or central 
executive mechanisms (e.g. Baddeley, 1986; Norman & Shallice, 1986).  
In summary, the results of the CFQ and CFQ-for-others indicate that dyslexic and 
control adults differ in the self-rating of the frequency of cognitive failures in day-to-day 
life. Overall, the dyslexics rate themselves as being more vulnerable to lapses. It would 
appear from the CFQ and CFQ-for-others that the group differences manifest themselves in 
terms of a greater proclivity to problems in distractibility, over-focusing (so that relevant 
peripheral information is missed- c.f. McDaniel & Einstein, 2000; Marsh & Hicks, 2000), 
memory, and word-finding difficulties. This is in accordance with both anecdotal reports 
and laboratory studies and presents a strong case for further work to investigate everyday 
cognition in dyslexia. In addition, it would appear that, despite their artificial nature, 
laboratory studies of dyslexia elicit impairments that reflect processes that are of 
significance to the individual in everyday life.  
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The adoption of the everyday memory paradigm has provided new insight into the 
memory problems of dyslexia and has gone some way toward showing that phonological 
processes, whilst playing an important role in the condition, are not responsible for all the 
deficits apparent in this area of cognition. This study indicates that there is a broad range of 
everyday difficulties experienced by dyslexic adults. The problems associated with the 
condition are not restricted either to the laboratory setting, academic contexts, or to the 
phonological domain. It is vital that these difficulties are taken into account when designing 
working environments to support adults with dyslexia. 
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Table 1: Group means and F-values for each item of the CFQ. Self-ratings of 
the frequency of occurrence of the CFQ items ranged from 0 (Never) to 4 (Very 
Often). Significance levels are indicated prior to application of Bonferroni 
corrections. For corrected significance at the P < 0.05 level, items must have a 
P-value of less than 0.002. The final column fits the data of the present study to 
the five factors extracted from Pollina et al.’s (1992) principal components 
analysis. 
 
CFQ Item Control Dyslexic F P Factor 
1. Do you read something and 
find you haven’t been thinking 
about it and must read it again? 
2.94 3.38 2.69 .109 Distractibility 
2. Do you find you forget why 
you went from one part of the 
house to the other? 
1.84 2.62 11.59  .001 ** Distractibility 
3. Do you fail to notice signposts 
on the road? 
1.53 2.16 4.27  .045 * Spatial/ 
kinaesthetic 
memory 
4. Do you find that you confuse 
right and left when giving 
directions? 
1.40 2.14 3.33 .075 Spatial/ 
kinaesthetic 
memory 
5. Do you bump into people? 1.53 1.64 0.15 .697 Spatial/ 
kinaesthetic 
memory 
6. Do you find that you forget 
whether you’ve turned off a light 
or fire or locked the door? 
1.82 2.60 7.72  .008 ** Spatial/ 
kinaesthetic 
memory 
7. Do you fail to listen to people’s 
names when you are meeting 
them? 
2.61 3.46 13.38  .001 ** Memory for 
names 
8. Do you find that you say 
something and realise that it 
might be taken as insulting? 
1.76 2.28 4.71  .036 * Interpersonal 
intelligence 
9. Do you fail to hear people 
speaking to you when you are 
doing something else? 
1.82 2.74 12.04  .001 ** Misdirected 
actions 
10. Do you lose your temper and 0.95 1.80 8.46  .006 ** Interpersonal 
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regret it? intelligence 
11. Do you leave important letters 
unanswered for days? 
1.90 2.76 6.61  .014 * Interpersonal 
intelligence 
12. Do you find you forget which 
way to turn on a road you know 
well but rarely use? 
1.16 1.64 3.03 .089 Misdirected 
actions 
13. Do you fail to see what you 
want in a supermarket (although 
it’s there)? 
1.79 2.52 5.92  .019 * Misdirected 
actions 
14. Do you find yourself suddenly 
wondering whether you’ve used a 
word correctly?  
1.40 2.44 23.10  .000 *** Distractibility 
& Misdirected 
actions 
15. Do you have trouble making 
up your mind? 
2.26 2.12 0.19 .662 Distractibility 
16. Do you find you forget 
appointments? 
1.32 1.84 3.37 .073 Misdirected 
actions 
17. Do you forget where you put 
something like a newspaper? 
2.29 2.92 6.55  .014 * Misdirected 
actions 
18. Do you find you accidentally 
throw away the thing you want 
and keep what you meant to 
throw away- as in the example of 
throwing away the matchbox and 
putting the used match in your 
pocket? 
1.53 1.78 0.73 .397 Misdirected 
actions & 
Spatial/ 
kinaesthetic 
memory 
19. Do you daydream when you 
ought to be listening to 
something? 
2.45 3.12 9.29  .004 ** Distractibility 
20. Do you forget people’s 
names? 
2.84 3.36 3.89 .055 Memory for 
names 
21. Do you start doing one thing 
at home and get distracted into 
doing something else? 
2.26 2.94 7.89  .008 ** Distractibility 
22. Do you find you can’t quite 
remember something although it’s 
“on the tip of your tongue”? 
2.53 3.30 16.22  .000 *** Distractibility 
23. Do you find you forget what 
you came to the shops to buy? 
1.42 2.34 13.68  .001 ** Misdirected 
actions 
24. Do you drop things? 1.58 1.48 0.17 .675 Spatial/ 
kinaesthetic 
memory 
25. Do you find you can’t think of 
anything to say? 
2.29 1.80 2.74  .105 Distractibility 
Key: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. All remaining differences were non-significant. 
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Table 2: Group mean ratings, standard deviations and F value for each item of the 
CFQ-for-others. Ratings of the frequency of occurrence of the different types of 
cognitive failures of the CFQ-for-others ranged from 0 (Never) to 4 (Very Often). 
Significance levels are indicated prior to application of Bonferroni corrections. For 
corrected significance at the p<0.05 level, items must have a p-value of less than 0.005. 
 
CFQ-for-others Item Control Dyslexic F P 
1. Absent-minded, that is making 
mistakes in what he/she is doing 
because he/she is thinking of 
something else? 
1.52 2.24 9.98  .003 ** 
2. Finding it difficult to 
concentrate on anything because 
his/her attention tends to wander 
from one thing to another? 
1.62 2.44 6.89  .012 ** 
3. Forgetful, such as forgetting 
where he/she has put things, or 
about appointments, or about what 
he/she has done? 
1.95 2.40 1.60 .213 
4. Busy thinking about his/her own 
affairs and not noticing what is 
going on around him/her? 
2.00 1.96 0.02 .897 
5. Clumsy, for example, dropping 
things or bumping into people? 
1.24 1.48 0.54 .465 
6. Having difficulty in making up 
his/her mind? 
2.14 1.84 0.744 .393 
7. Disorganised, that is, getting 
into a muddle when doing 
something because of lack of 
planning or concentration? 
1.05 2.20 12.136  .001 ** 
8. Getting unduly cross about 
minor matters? 
1.76 2.04 0.55 .463 
Key: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. All other differences were non-significant. 
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Footnotes. 
                                                          
1
 As a further check, a random subsample of 4 participants was screened for dyslexia in the 
present study, using the ADI diagnostic measures. The standard WAIS-R subtests were 
employed to obtain a short form IQ, namely Similarities, Comprehension, Block Design, 
and Picture Completion (Wechsler, 1986a). This produced a mean of 110.75 (SD= 4.19). 
All of the control group so screened obtained a spelling age of greater than 17 years (the 
ceiling on the WORD test is 17 years) and did not have any difficulties with the nonsense 
passage, either in terms of speed or accuracy of performance. 
